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Abstract: This paper attempts to offer a new 
understanding of some fundamental aspects nature of 
Malay and Islam identity, using Malaysia as a case 
study. I first sketch the history of the region and it 
heir to Hindu and Buddhist traditions and also to 
three European colonial systems of government and 
administration (Portuguese, Dutch and British). 
Second, I point out how state-led mediates essential 
of the peninsula “Malay” as territorial and indigenous 
(bumiputra) appears to have led to the inclusion and 
exclusion of the pre and post-colonial migrant at 
various moments in the process of negotiating Malay 
identity, making of the Malay-Muslim ethnicity. 
Finally, I argue and maintain that the process of 
“othering” in multicultural Malaysia seems triggered 
by “ontological insecurity “and “de-
traditionalisation”, as pointed out by Anthony 
Giddens (1990), and the hegemonic construction of 
Malay identity dilemma. To understand the conflict 
of religions in Malaysia, one has to understand the 
link between religion and the state, and the pluralistic 
nature of Malaysian society and one must begin with 
data from the area rather than with some Middle 
Eastern and theological formulations of Islam. 
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or better or worse, religion is a major concern 
in Malaysia and this makes it a major national 
concern in the Malaysian politics. Moreover, 
as Islam is the state religion of the Malay community, 
Islam is consequently, in the hearts of many of the 
country’s major political conflicts. What worries the 
nation the most today is that many Malaysians, 
particularly the right-wing Malays, are no longer 
practicing moderation very well. Many have began to 
move to the fringe right on the issue of race and 
appear to be quite close to openly advocating 
apartheid. A similar move to the far right seems to be 
underway with regards to religious issues and this 
will create even more troubles.  
In the period of 54 years since Malaysia’s 
independence, Islam has become increasingly 
prominent in the public domain of Malaysia, which is 
a multi-ethnic and multi-religious federation. The 
relationship between religions, ethnics and national 
identities in Malaysia has long been fraught with 
uncomfortable tensions. I shall critically examine th  
Malaysian success story, especially as a Muslim-
majority country, by presenting a survey of the 
making of the Malaysian Islam. This presentation 
combines both narrative and analysis with the aim of 
presenting to those who already have some 
knowledge about Malaysia with a better 
understanding of its present situation. For those who
F
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are 'experts, this essay serves as an invitation for a 
critical discourse on Islam in Malaysia.   
Emerson (1957), Furnival (1948) and Chopra (1974) 
contended that the Malaysian plural society is divided 
in almost every respect. As a plural society, nation 
building or national integration (Ibrahim, 1985) is 
considered of the utmost importance in Malaysia. 
Since the 1980s, however, the religion identity 
appears to have been replaced by ethnicity as the 
central element of the nation’s identity as the society 
has been systematically, even aggressively, 
Islamised. Yet appearances can be deceiving, and 
there is a strong case to be made that Islamisation in 
Malaysia is basically a variation of the original Malay 
ethnonationalism, using the nearly complete 
symbiosis between the Malay and Muslim identity as 
the point of articulation that allows the religious 
nationalism to serve as a cipher for 
ethnonationalism,/but a version of ethnonationalism 
that is much less accommodating of minorities than 
the traditional Malay nationalism.  
For now, managing religious sensitivities has the 
verisimilitude of heightened consciousness and 
identity policing. 
“The level of religious sensitivity is different  as it 
was before. If it was, we would have no problem. 
However, some people consider certain matters as too 
sensitive" (ex-Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah 
Badawi). 
Therefore, the main aim of this essay is to outline 
briefly the history of the Malay and the emergence of 
Islam in Malaysia, a history, I thought essential for an 
understanding of the current renewal of Islam within 
the Malay ethnic, in particular, Malaysia. Therefor, I 
will analyze the special character and position of the 
Malaysian Islam, beginning from the arrival of Islam 
to the Malay Archipelago in the 15th century, the 
Malacca Sultanate period, its status during the British 
colonial period and its subsequent developments after
independence in 1957. 
The conclusion of this article is less of a conclusion 
but more of an observation that suggests that the 
current scenario can be improved. Living 
harmoniously under one roof can be achieved if all 
parties are willing to be more open, considerate and 
practice toleration. 
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN MALAYSIA  
With its ethnic, cultural and religious diversities, 
Malaysia is a typical South-East Asia country. Fifty-
one percent of the population of Malaysia consists of 
Malays, all of whom are Muslim.1 Chinese made up 
                                                
1 All ethnic Malays are Muslims. This is a unique 
position in comparison with other Muslim-dominated 
26 percent of the population and Indians comprised 7 
percent of the population. Various ethnic groups, 
such as different indigenous groups, who are mostly 
residing in the Borneo region, and Eurasians and 
migrant workers, most of whom are Indonesians, 
make up the remaining 16 percent of the population 
(Peletz 2005, p.243). 
Despite the Muslim majority, Malaysia is not an 
Islamic state.2 Instead, Malaysia is considered to be a 
“Malay dominated plural society” and the freedom of 
practicing other religions is granted to all (Shamsul 
1997, p.29). The Constitution provides freedom of 
religion; however, the Government has placed some 
restrictions on this right.  
The Government provides financial support to an 
Islamic religious establishment composed of a variety 
of governmental, quasi-governmental, and other 
institutions, and it indirectly provides more limited 
funds to the non-Muslim communities. State 
governments impose Islamic religion laws on 
Muslims in some cultural and social matters but 
generally do not interfere with the religious practices 
of the non-Muslim communities.  
This conception of Malay hegemonic rule is a result 
of the political bargaining between the major ethnic 
political groups of Malaysia, UMNO (United Malays 
National Organization), MCA (Malaysian Chinese 
Association) and MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) 
during the formation of post-colonial Malaysia (at 
that time known as Malaya) in 1957. As a result of 
the bargaining, non-Malay ethnic groups such as the 
Chinese and Indians were granted citizenship and 
their “legitimate interests (economic rights), their 
rights of citizenship and residence as well as their 
freedom to preserve, practice and propagate their 
religion, culture and language” were recognized 
(Ibrahim, p.128).   
In return, Malays will retained their sultans, their 
special position, their language (as the official 
language), and their religion (Islam as the official 
religion)” (Ibrahim, p.128). In addition, special rights 
                                                                     
regions. For example, not all Arabs are Muslims. The 
converging of ethnicity and religion in Malaysia’s 
case can be a thorny issue as we shall see later. 
2 The question of whether Malaysia is an Islamic state 
remains highly contentious and ambiguous. The 
former prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir 
Mohamad stated explicitly that Malaysia is an 
Islamic state on September 29, 2001. This was seen 
as a political move to detract supporters from the 
rising Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. Mahathir’s 
statement provoked an outrage from the Chinese and 
Indian communities who claimed that Malaysia is not 
an Islamic state under the Federal Constitution.  
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were granted to protect the Malay ethnic rights. This 
is enshrined in the controversial and often quoted 
Article 153 in the constitution of Malaysia. 
According to this article, those who “profess the 
religion of Islam, habitually speak the Malay 
language, and conform to the Malay customs” are 
entitled for special reservation of quotas in three 
specific areas: public services, education, and 
business licenses, without harming the rights of other 
ethnic groups. Thus, it is important to emphasize that
Malaysia is founded “not on individual rights but on
what political theorists have come to refer to as 
‘ethnically differentiated citizenship’” (Hefner 2001, 
p.29).   
The state of religious pluralism in Malaysia firmly 
hinges upon understanding the importance of Article 
153 of the constitution. The Article was conceived as 
part of an “ethnic bargaining” that was achieved 
through the spirit of mutual tolerance and respect. A 
deeper understanding of Malaysia’s pre and post-
colonial history is necessary to understand the stat  of 
the religious and racial pluralism in Malaysia. 
PRE-COLONIAL PLURALISM AND COLONIAL 
PLURALISM IN M ALAYSIA  
The land of Malaysia has been made the center of 
trade and commerce since the tenth century AD when 
ancient Malay kingdoms were discovered in the 
northern peninsular region of Malaysia. In the first 
century, traders from the south of India started to sail 
to the islands in South-East Asia. They continued for 
hundreds of years. They came to Malaya, Indo-China, 
Sumatra, Java and Borneo, established themselves 
and took the Indian culture and arts with them. Some 
of the rulers in these lands gradually abandoned 
animism and embraced Hinduism. Their states 
became Hindu states and Hindu empires were 
established in these lands. Soon, the Buddhist 
philosophy and teachings also arrived and were 
spread widely in these regions. Most of these 
kingdoms were under the Buddhism or Hinduism 
influence. During that time, the region was highly 
coveted due to its geographical position which is 
situated in between the Chinese and Indian 
civilizations.   
As in the case with Hinduism and Buddhism, the 
Islam’s original home is not the Malay world. Islam 
was brought to the region, mainly by people of 
foreign origins, many of whom were merchants and 
Sufis. When it arrived in the Malay world, Islam 
encountered an enormously. 
rich and vibrant Malay civilization that had 
experienced a history of at least a thousand years and 
whose cornerstone was formed by indigenous 
animistic beliefs. Thus, anthropologically speaking, it 
is unthinkable that Islam could have transformed this
civilization overnight. In fact, it took Islam a few 
centuries to find a comfortable home in the Malay 
world (Hooker, 1983; Harper, 1999). 
Islam was believed to have arrived in Malaysia 
around the 14th century through Arab traders from the 
Middle-East. However, it was not until the 
establishment of the Sultanate of Malacca in the 15th 
century that Islam became the dominant religion in 
the Southeast Asian region. During this era, Malacca 
became the main trading port of Asia where 
European merchants travelled to obtain the valuable 
commodity of spices that were readily available in 
Asia but not in Europe.  
Soon, some of the rulers and their subjects in the 
region of South Thailand, Malaya and Sumatra 
embraced Islam. Foreigners who came here during 
that time easily adapt to the local cultures. The 
Europeans and Chinese traders who settled here 
adapted the new environment. Many blended into the 
society but retained their original religious beliefs. 
There is no history of Islam being imposed upon the 
people.   
The first ruler of Malacca, Parameswara, converted to 
Islam after his marriage to the Princess Malik Ul 
Salih of Pasai. It was during this period that Islam 
spread to the territories of the sultanate, including the 
majority of modern-day Peninsular Malaysia, 
Sumatra in Indonesia and northern Thailand. At this
time laymen and traders alike embraced Islam 
because of the advantages which came with 
identifying oneself with the ruler’s religion.   
Despite being the predominant religion in the 
Kingdom of Malacca, Islam was not imposed upon 
the people and foreign traders, allowing people with 
different religions to co-exist together. This was one 
of the first recorded instances of the ethnic and 
religious pluralism in Malaysia.   
Foreigners easily integrated themselves into the local 
Malay culture. Many foreign traders such as the 
Europeans and the Chinese familiarized themselves 
with the Malay customs and learned to speak the 
Malay language. Cross-cultural marriages between 
traders and the people of Malacca were common 
during this period.  
The marriage of the sixth ruler of Malacca, Sultan 
Mansur Syah, to a Chinese princess, Hang Li Po, 
further encouraged cross-cultural marriages. The 
legacy of these marriages can be seen today in the 
Peranakan culture where they are a group of ethnic 
Chinese, who practices a syneretic blend of the 
Malay and Chinese culture by speaking the Malay 
language while maintaining the Buddhist tradition.   
The rule of the Sultanate of Malacca lasted for a 
century until it was conquered by the Portuguese in 
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1511. The fall of Malacca in the hands of the 
Portuguese represents the beginning of foreign 
colonization of Malaysia. Malacca prospered for 
another century until the invasion by the Dutch. This 
is followed by the intervention of the British during 
the late eighteenth century which subsequently led to 
the colonization of Malacca and ultimately, the whole 
of peninsular and Borneo Malaysia. This period of 
colonization lasted for almost two centuries until 
independence was granted to Malaysia in 1957. 
The arrival of the British transformed the history of 
Malaysia forever. It has been argued that the British 
colonial rule altered the shape of the ethnic and 
religious pluralism in Malaysia. The Malaysian social 
anthropologist, Zawawi Ibrahim, contends that “it 
was the subsequent elaborations by colonialism upon 
this pre-colonial pluralism, which gave rise to the 
ethnicism and competing ethnicities currently 
inherited by the modern Malaysian nation-state” 
(Ibrahim, p.116).   
The British had the acumen to symbolically 
acknowledge the sultans’ sovereignty over each state, 
whose rule encompassed matters relating to the 
Malay tradition such as the customs (adat), the 
language (bahasa), and Islam. The sultans were also 
provided with “bureaucratic and legal machinery to 
implement their direction in a more systematic and 
invasive manner than ever before in the Malay 
history” (Hefner 2001, p.16). In spite of these moves, 
the colonialists were primarily responsible for the 
running of the colonized Malay states because of “the
British’s move of giving symbolic powers to the 
Sultan and divorced the traditional ruling class from 
the economic affairs of the modern colonial system 
by dismantling their ‘feudal’ rights of surplus 
appropriation over the subject class” (Ibrahim, 
p.120).   
During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century, Malaysia became the largest tin producer in 
the world and the Chinese were needed to share their 
expertise in this field. The British invited the Indians 
due to the need for labor in the plantation sector, 
especially in the rubber industry which was a boon 
for the British. The coming of the Chinese and India  
ethnic groups inevitably altered the ethos-pluralistic 
setting of Malaysia. Due to the influx, the Chinese 
outnumbered the Malays in peninsular Malaysia by 
the early 1920s.   
A decade later, the Chinese population in the four 
federated states (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan 
and Pahang) that were subject to the direct rule of the 
British comprised 64 percent of the population. In 
other states that were not directly under the British 
rule, the Chinese comprised only 27 percent of the 
total population (Hefner 2001, p.18). This imbalance 
ethnic composition presented an obvious problem to 
the socio-economic stability of the country which 
was further compounded by the ‘divide and rule’ 
policy of the British.  
Though short in labor to uncover the vast riches of 
Malaysia’s natural resources through mining and 
plantations, the British was unwilling to teach these 
skills to the Malays because “the political costs of 
such a strategy would have been high” (Hefner 2001, 
p.18). The teaching of these skills would indicate that 
the Malays will learn to master trade and may revolt 
against their colonial masters. 
Under colonialism, different ethnic groups were not
allowed to mingle with each other; instead, they 
existed mainly within their own ethnic spheres. The 
Malays were primarily in the rural areas engaging i 
agriculture while most of the educated Malays were 
hired as government servants. The Chinese 
dominated the trade industry while the Indians 
remained in the plantation sector.   
This period of colonialism in Malaysia fits the mould 
of J. S. Furnivall’s theory of pluralism. Furnivall was 
largely responsible for coining and introducing the 
term “pluralism” to the European world. He derived 
his theory from his experience of colonial economies 
in Burma and Indonesia. Hefner summarizes 
Furnivall’s definition of pluralism:  
“A plural society is a society that comprises ‘two or 
more elements of social orders which live side by 
side, yet without mingling, in one political unit.’ As 
with the Chinese, Indians, and Malays in British 
Malaya, this combination of geographical propinquity 
and social segregation, Furnivall argued, is 
accompanied by a caste-like division of labor, in 
which the ethno religious groups play different 
economic roles.  This social segregation in turn gives 
rise to what Furnivall regarded as these societies’ 
most unsettling political trait: their lack of a common 
social will” (Hefner 2001, p.4). 
This policy of “divide and rule” further destabilized 
the ethnic stability of the country because ethnic 
groups like the Chinese were perceived as being 
wealthier than others. Due to the widespread busines  
influence of the Chinese who ranged from the 
production of tin and rubber to the transportation 
sector, the Chinese community was seen as 
monopolizing the economy and as a result, the 
migrant community, especially the Chinese was 
perceived as a threat to the Malays. Hefner explains, 
“In as much as the Chinese and Indians figured in this 
formulation (of ethnic pluralism), they did so largely 
negatively, as foreigners who threatened to 
marginalize the Malays in their homeland” (Hefner 
2001, p.24).   
This misperception against the Chinese community 
built a silent wall of tension between the different 
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ethnic groups of Malaysia. Unbeknownst to the 
Malays and Indians, most of the riches were in the 
hands of the British. The fact was that a “large 
majority of the Chinese was lowly paid wage earners 
employed in tin mines, rubber plantations and 
unskilled urban sector jobs. A minority was self-
employed small proprietors, and few were affluent 
capitalists” (Heng 1998, p.54).   
The “divide and rule” policy also meant that religion 
is not a contentious issue between the different ethnic 
groups. The lack of interaction between these groups 
meant that they can practice their religion freely 
without fearing any reprisal from other groups. There 
was also a distinct separation between religion and 
the British-governed state during this period of 
colonial pluralism.  
As the symbolic rulers of the Malay states and the 
protectors of the Islamic faith, the sultans played their 
role by ensuring that the Malay culture, and their 
religion of Islam were not denigrated in the midst of 
this influx of other religions. However, no socio-
economic protective measures were introduced to 
help the Malays to compete with the thriving Chinese 
dominated merchant community that had already 
established a network of capital and credit through 
their connections with different Chinese associations 
and chambers of commerce, which were already 
established as early as 1906 (Heng 1998, p.55).   
The colonialists’ policy of indifference towards the 
socio-economic development of these ethnic groups, 
especially with the Malays, highlighted their role in 
creating a society that not only “lacked a common 
social will” but more seriously, one that was 
separated into different economic positions based 
upon the ethos-religious background. In fact, in the
British ideology of educating the Malays, the Malay 
schools' curricula should be designed to ensure that 
the “Malay peasants did not get ideas above their 
station." This led to teaching schoolchildren basket-
weaving and gardening in order to educate them in 
the “dignity of manual labor” (Roff 1967, 140). 
In spite of this, the colonialists must not be blamed 
entirely for this “ethnicization” of the economy. The 
Malay rulers must also take a share of the blame for 
not being able to protect the economic rights of the 
Malays. These socio-economic failures of both the 
colonialists and the Malay rulers would pose a 
serious problem to Malaysia when it was granted 
independence from the British in 1957. 
After the 2nd World War, the British could no longer 
maintain their imperialist control over their colonies. 
Malaysia was finally becoming a sovereign nation 
state. When the British tried to establish the Malay n 
Union, one of the main contentions was the rights to 
citizenship of the ethnic Chinese and Indians, and the 
other was the sovereignty of the Malay sultans. 
Whilst the non-Malays and several ‘radical’ Malays 
were supportive of the Malayan Union, several of the 
‘nationalists campaigned against it. They finally got 
all the Sultans in unison to oppose its establishment. 
Today, Malaysia is considered a sovereign nation. It 
is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural 
country. The Malay ethnic group makes up about half 
of the total population. Malaysia has decided to 
maintain two parallel justice systems; one is the 
secular justice system based upon laws gazette by the 
parliament, and the other is the Syariah Court whose 
rules are set by the various sultans of the state. Th  
Syariah Court has jurisdiction over the Muslims only. 
Clearly  the non-Muslims do not have any legal 
standing in the Syariah Courts as they are limited in 
their jurisdiction by Article 121 of the Federal 
Constitution. 
PLURALISM AFTER M ALAYSIA ’S INDEPENDENCE 
Malaysia was granted independence during the de-
colonization period in the middle of the twentieth 
century. After nearly two centuries of colonial rule, 
Malaysia finally became a sovereign nation state. The
first general election in the country in 1955 was won 
by the Alliance (Parti Perikatan) that was led by 
Malaysia’s father of Independence, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman. The Alliance consisted of the United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO), the main 
political party of the Malays, the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA), the party for the Chinese, and 
the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), which 
represents the Indian community.   
One of the major controversial issues in this young 
nation-state was the question of citizenship among 
different ethnic groups. While the Malays were 
acknowledged as the rightful owners of the land 
along with the indigenous people, the rights to 
citizenship of the Chinese and Indians were 
questioned.3 When the British tried to establish the 
Malayan Union in 1949, which intends to give equal 
citizenship to all Malaysians regardless of their 
ethnicity, the proposal triggered widespread protests 
from the Malays. The sultans were united in their 
protest and refused to co-operate in this effort. Due to 
the fierce protests, the plan had to be abandoned by 
the British. This example highlights the sensitivity of 
the issue of non-Malay citizenship for the Malays. 
A concession was finally achieved between UMNO, 
MCA and MIC regarding the issue of citizenship and 
special rights for the Malays. As explained in the 
introduction to this paper, this concession was 
                                                
3 The Malays and the indigenous people of Malaysia 
are called “bumiputera” or translated literally as the 
“princes of the soil” or “sons of the soil”.  
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enshrined in the Malaysian constitution under Article 
153, which entitles citizenship to non-Malays and i 
return, grants the Malay's special rights in the field of 
education, in public services and in commerce. The 
Non-Malay communities obtained the Malaysian 
citizenship, but it is not an equal citizenship. In 
Robert Hefner’s words, this form of citizenship was a 
“differentiated citizenship” (Hefner 2001, p.29).   
This concession must be analyzed carefully due to the 
sensitivity of the issue. UMNO was unwilling to 
grant equal citizenship to the non-Malay communities 
because they feared that the Chinese and Indians 
might overtake them socio-economically and 
inevitably result in the loss of their own sovereign 
rights. However, UMNO, which held the majority of 
the Malay votes, needed the support from the Chinese 
and Indians to appear as a politically united front in 
order to rule the country.  
Additionally, UMNO needed the economic support 
and knowledge from the wealthy Chinese community 
in the early years of the new nation to help the rural 
Malays to break the barriers of poverty. On the other 
hand, the Chinese and Indian communities had no 
choice but to concede to the request of the Malays in 
terms of the “differentiated citizenship” because it 
was politically impossible for the Malay rulers to 
grant equal citizenship to them after the strong 
reaction against the idea of the Malayan Union. 4 
The independence of Malaysia did not improve the 
economic situation of the poor. According to Ibrahim 
Z., “The average income of the bottom 10 percent of 
all households decreased by 31 percent, from $49 to 
$33 per month, between 1957-1970…income 
equality worsened for the total population as well as 
within each community, with the Malays taking the 
lead” (Ibrahim, p.130). This highlighted the problem 
of massive economic inequality between the rich and 
the poor during the early years of the nation.  
Ethnicity played a vital role in this inequality; while a 
significant part of the Chinese and British 
communities continued to prosper, the Malays and 
Indians remained entrenched in their poverty. 
Unemployment rates were also high in the cities and 
this primarily affected the Chinese and the growing 
number of Malay migrants. The failure of the ruling 
party to create a viable Malay capitalist class was 
perceived as the source of unemployment among the 
growing number of Malays in the cities (Ibrahim, 
p.131).   
The economic inequality triggered the eruption of the
worst ethnic violence ever seen in the country on 
                                                
4 J. N. Parmer, ‘Constitutional Change in Malaya’s 
Plural Society’, 26:10 Far Eastern Survey (October, 
1957) p. 146. 
May 13, 1969. What started out as a victory 
celebration in Kuala Lumpur for the Chinese 
opposition party, DAP (Democratic Action Party) 
which won a significant number of seats during the 
general election of that year, ended up provoking the 
Malay community in the city. This event highlighted 
the crisis which plagued the young nation-state as she 
struggled to discover her identity and seek the 
“common social will” in the midst of the multi-
cultural setting of Malaysia. 
The May 13 riots changed the socio-economic setting 
of Malaysia and Malaysians altogether. The second 
prime minister Tun Abdul Razak, introduced the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), an affirmative action based 
policy as a measure to eradicate poverty among the 
Malays. Michael Peletz, an anthropologist who is an 
expert in the Southeast Asian issues contends that the 
NEP was a measure to “restructure society by 
undermining the material and symbolic connections 
between ethnic categories, on the one hand, and 
economic standing and function on the other” (Peletz 
2005, p.245). This policy of restructuring the society 
which involved the ethnic and racial politics was 
considered as special allocations granted to the 
Malays.  
The NEP was successful in producing a new 
generation of the middle-class Malays while 
eradicating poverty at the same time. The level of 
education among the Malays also improved 
tremendously. It was reported that between the early 
1970s and 1993, the middle-class Malays burgeoned 
from 18 percent to 28 percent of the population. 
Additionally, the Malay agricultural population 
decreased significantly from 65.2 percent to 33.5 
percent (Hefner 2001, p.30).   
Despite the apparent success of the NEP, many 
Malays remained unhappy about this policy because 
of the widely held perception that the policy helped 
only some Malays and not all, resulting in the 
creation of two distinct classes of Malays; those who 
have benefited from the NEP and those who have not. 
Thus, some Malays became rich and affluent while 
the rest of them remained entrenched in poverty. The 
dissatisfaction with the NEP also originated from the
widespread corruption and cronyism that were taking 
place during the implementation of this policy.     
Many scholars have argued quite rightly that the 
Malays’ discontent towards the NEP fueled the 
Islamic resurgence movement in Malaysia during the 
1970s. This resurgence is a continuation of the early 
Islamic revivalism in Malaysia which occurred 
during the 1920s and 1930s as a tool to promote 
Islamic nationalism and reformation. It is not by 
chance that this resurgence coincided with the 
Islamic revivalist movements in countries like 
Indonesia, Egypt, Libya and Pakistan. One of the 
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groups which spearheaded this resurgence was ABIM 
(Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Malaysian 
Islamic Youth Movement) led by the young Anwar 
Ibrahim, who would later become Malaysia’s Finance 
Minister and Deputy Minister. Another group which 
yielded immense influence was (PAS) Parti Islam Se-
Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Party), an Islamic 
political party that fought for the establishment of 
Malaysia as an Islamic state. 
Scholars have viewed the Islamic resurgence 
(dakwah) movement in Malaysia as “a powerful 
vehicle for the articulation of moral opposition to the 
government development policies, traditional as well 
as the emergence of class structures, other ethnic 
groups, or some combination of these or related 
phenomena” (Peletz 2005, p.246). This movement 
seeks to “revitalize or reactualize (local) Islam and 
the (local) Muslim community by encouraging 
stronger commitment to the teachings of the Qur’an 
and the hadith, in order to practice a more Islamic 
way of life (din)” (Peletz 2005, p.246).   
This Islamic resurgence exacerbated the growing 
hostility between the Malays and non-Malays ever 
since the implementation of the NEP. The Non-
Malays felt that not only their socio-economic 
positions were under threat but their rights to practice 
their religion were challenged as well. (Hefner 2001, 
p.51). 
Under the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, 
the government took measures to control the Islamic 
resurgence. One of the measures was using the 
government to espouse its own Islamization programs 
to counter the resurgence.  These programs 
championed the notion of moderate Islam in light of 
the multi-cultural setting of Malaysia. Additionally, 
the government also institutionalized Islam by 
“establishing an Islamic banking system, streamlining 
the administration of Islam, and setting up the Islamic 
International University” (Embong 2001, p.64).  
Politically, parties such as ABIM were co-opted into 
UMNO resulting in the loss of a powerful ally to 
PAS. All these efforts, compounded with the 
stunning economic development of Malaysia under 
Mahathir during the late 20th century resulted in the 
slow but steady establishment of “a common social 
will” for Malaysians of all races and religions.  
THE STATE OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN 
M ALAYSIA TODAY  
The astounding economic development of Malaysia 
during the late 20th century and early 21st century 
under Mahathir has propelled Malaysia to become 
one of the richest Southeast Asian countries. The 
Asian economic crisis in 1997 led to a crippling blow 
to the economy and consequently, to the people’s 
well-being. However, what was remarkable during 
this crisis was the absence of ethnic violence that was 
experienced in the neighboring country, Indonesia. 
This highlights the outstanding growth of the 
Malaysian society in terms of their understanding ad
respect for each other’s ethnic and religious 
background.     
While this growth can be attributed primarily to the 
economic success of the country, other notable 
factors must be taken into account to explain the 
molding of Malaysia into a cohesive and pluralistic 
society. The establishment of a strong middle-class, 
not just among the Malays but also among the non-
Malays has created an educated and sophisticated 
society that can relate to and communicate with those 
who are not from their ethnic groups.   
This has enabled the creation of a new generation of 
Malaysians, who experience multi-culturalism daily.  
Education policies that were reformed after the May 
13 riots created a more literate society because 
schools were no longer a privilege for the rich buta 
social necessity.  
As a result, students from all ethnic backgrounds 
were given the chance to mingle with each other. The 
opening of the doors of Chinese and Indian schools 
allowed the non-Chinese and non-Indian parents to 
enroll their children to these schools to learn an extra 
language or to take advantage of the better 
educational opportunities offered in these schools. 
These factors have led to the creation of a new 
Malaysian society that is developing a “common 
social will” despite its ethnic barriers.   
Although a series of interesting debates took place 
with regard to the government’s definition of Islamic 
values, the federal government continued its 
Islamization efforts by initiating the setting up of
various kinds of Islamic institutions (Shamsul, 1997). 
For example, the first Malaysian Islamic Bank began 
its operation in July 1983. In the same year, the 
International Islamic University (IIU) was set up to 
implement the concept of integrating knowledge with 
morals. As part of the intensification of the 
Islamization of the economic sphere, the federal 
government restructured the poorly organized 
Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam (Malaysian 
Islamic Development Foundation). The ongoing 
process of Islamization in the administration has also 
been monitored by the Islamic Consultative Council, 
one of the powerful committees formed by the Prime 
Minister to propose policies on the Islamization 
programs.   
Overall, the Malaysian government’s Islamization 
program not only brought Islam into the mainstream 
of the national economy and helped to increase 
religious consciousness among the Malay-Muslim 
middle-class, but also raised Malaysia’s profile 
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among Islamic countries as an economically 
successful and politically stable multicultural Islamic 
nation that should be emulated by others in the 
Islamic world (Shamsul, 1997:216–222).  
The retirement of Mahathir in 2003 after ruling the 
country for 22 years signified the end of an important 
era of the Malaysian politics. The torch was passed to 
Abdullah Badawi, who was Mahathir’s chosen 
successor. Mahathir’s retirement came during a time
when the multi-religious setting of Malaysia was 
under threat from the growing global Islamic 
fundamentalist movement. The event of September 
11, 2001 was significant because Malaysia was 
indirectly linked to fundamentalist movements like 
Al-Qaeda.   
There were reports claiming that Malaysia became a 
“staging area” or “launching pad” where Al-Qaeda 
members met to plan on their next attacks (Peletz 
2005, p.241). These reports were backed by evidence 
to support their claims. In November 2000, Yazid 
Sufaat was photographed hosting Nawak Alhazmi, 
Khalid al-Midhar and Zacarias Mousasaoui in his 
condominium in Malaysia. All three of them were 
directly connected to the September 11 events (Peletz 
2005, p.241).  
The Southeast Asian based Islamic terrorist group, 
Jemaayah Islamiyah (JI) that was directly responsible 
for the three massive bombings in Indonesia: Bali in 
2002, the Marriott Hotel Bombing in 2003 and the 
2004 Australian Embassy Bombing, included 
Malaysians, who were directly involved with the 
group’s activities. Azahari Husein, a doctorate holder 
from the University of Reading in England was “the 
Demolition Man” while Nordin Mohamad Top was 
the bomb maker of the group.   
As a result of this rise in the Islamic fundamentalism 
in Malaysia, Badawi has introduced Islamization 
programs to counter the resurgence not just in 
Malaysia but also in other Islamic countries. One of 
his most remarkable moves is the introduction of the 
concept of Islam Hadhari (Civilised Islam) which is a 
ten-point set of canonical principles that calls for b th 
physical and spiritual development by emphasizing 
on the economic, social and political progress.  
Badawi explains that “Islam Hadhari is not a new 
religion or a new religious order but merely re-
emphasizes on the centrality of Islam in the daily 
lives of its believers” (The Star, July 25, 2006). He 
asserts that Islam Hadhari “can help bring Muslims 
into the modern world and integrate them in the 
modern economy.”   
The term ‘integrate’ is important because Islam 
Hadhari suggests the Islamic world to integrate and 
not assimilate into the modern economy. This careful 
integration into the global economy allows for the 
retaining of their cultural identities. Additionally, the 
concept also “promotes tolerance and understanding, 
moderation and peace, certainly an enlightenment” 
(Badawi 2005). More importantly, Badawi believes 
that Islam Hadhari can help in preventing the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism.  
Badawi has implemented these reforms in Malaysia 
with impressive results. The economy is currently 
recovering consistently from the Asian economic 
crisis, and corruption is at an all-time lowest level. 
The International Islamic University of Malaysia 
(IIUM) is fast becoming one of the major Islamic 
institutions in the world that is comparable with the 
esteemed Al-Azhar University of Egypt and attracts 
many students from the Islamic countries. IIUM 
offers programs not only in Islamic studies but in 
science as well, ranging from engineering to 
medicine.   
The strong undercurrent of Islamization programs 
such as Islam Hadhari in Malaysia has created a 
subtle tension between the Malays and non-Malays. 
The Non-Malay communities are fearful that these 
programs might impinge on their own rights. Badawi 
has been quick to assuage the situation by claiming 
that Islam Hadhari is a concept that is only meant for 
the Muslims and will not directly impinge on the 
non-Malays’ right to practice their own religions. 
This underlines the thin line that is constantly 
negotiated by Badawi and his government in light of 
the drive to promote them as a moderate Islamic 
government without forsaking the religious rights of 
other ethnic groups.  
Despite proclaiming themselves as a moderate 
Islamic government, several religious controversies 
have challenged this notion. The issue of Malaysians’ 
freedom of religion is questioned, especially when it 
comes to Islam. The controversial case of the late M. 
Moorthy tested the waters of religious tolerance in 
Malaysia.   
Moorthy, originally a Hindu, was alleged to have 
converted to Islam by the syariah court before his 
untimely death. Hence, he was buried in the 
traditional Islamic way. However, his wife, M. 
Kaliammal claimed that she had evidence proving 
that Moorthy was a Hindu before his death and 
sought to take the case to the Malaysian court system 
to have him buried according to the traditional Hindu 
rites. Unfortunately, her case was rejected as it was
deemed as not being under the powers of the civil 
court but the syariah court of Malaysia. Kaliammal 
has launched another appeal, and her case is awaiting 
hearing in September 2006. 
The infamous controversy surrounding the case of 
Lina Joy provides another example concerning the 
freedom of religion of the individual. Joy, her real 
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name being Azlina Jalani, was once a Muslim but 
converted to Christianity. She wanted to drop the 
term ‘Islam’ from her identification card as her 
religion, but she was not permitted to do so by the 
National Registry Department (NRD).   
Joy brought her case to the court to appeal and 
similarly to the Moorthy’s case, the civil court 
dismissed her case based on the same argument that 
this matter was under the auspices of thesyariah 
court. This controversy underlines the issue of one’s 
religious freedom in Malaysia, especially when it 
comes to the Malays. Adherents from other faiths can 
convert to other religions but not the Muslims, who 
can be deemed apostates and punished under the 
syariah court. 
Apart from the questions concerning the individual’s 
freedom of religion in Malaysia, there is also a 
growing concern among the Muslims, especially 
among clerics, that the increased pluralistic setting of 
Malaysia can erode the Muslims’ faith.  During the 
recent 2006 Ulama Convention in the Perak state, the 
mufti from Perak, Harussani Zakaria warned against 
pluralism and liberalism in his keynote speech. He 
said, “Muslims, whether policymakers or ordinary 
people, should know that liberalism and pluralism 
were alien to the fundamentals of Islam” and warned 
against “the threats to Islam posed by these elements” 
(Mustafa 2006).  
As a result of this stance against pluralism and 
liberalism, activities which encourage multi-cultural 
unity were seen as a threat to Islam because they 
might erode the Muslims’ faith. Events such as 
“shared celebrations” (kongsi raya) which stands for 
open houses organized by the government to 
celebrate different ethnic groups’ celebrations (such 
as Chinese New Year, Eid al-Adha and Deepavali) 
which fall around the same time were discouraged by 
the clerics.  
The clerics’ statements were unpopular with the 
government and also with the people who strongly 
objected the clerics’ anti-pluralist stance. This 
incident reflected the underlying tension between the 
government and the Islamic religious leaders where 
one tries to be more moderate while the other is 
becoming more conservative in light of Malaysia’s 
current economic growth in the era of globalization.     
The question of religious pluralism was recently 
challenged during the planned demolition of 
unregistered Hindu temples in Kuala Lumpur in order 
to make space for development. Local state councils 
that were responsible for these projects claimed that 
these temples, mostly built before Malaysia’s 
independence in 1957, are illegal because they are not 
registered.   
Additionally, most of these temples were also built 
on the government land.  These demolitions came 
with alleged police brutality against the protesting 
Indians. Inevitably, these actions infuriated not only 
the Malaysian Indians, but also Indians around the 
world. Most Indians blamed the actions on the 
government’s lack of intervention and insensitivity to 
the temple demolition exercise. A Malaysian 
opposition source noted, “The government is 
breaking down (Hindu) temples because they can 
afford to do it to the Indians…we have never heard of 
a mosque being broken down for development" 
(Bukhari 2006).   
Both the government’s and the local councils’ 
insensitivity to this issue might prove to be the trigger 
to an already tense situation in Malaysia. The notion 
of respect for other religions is negated in the face of 
impending development but at what cost for the 
country and its inter-ethnic relations? 
The state of religious pluralism in Malaysia is one 
that is intrinsically connected to the question of 
ethnicity. The question of respect for each other’s 
religion subsequently engenders a respect for one’s 
ethnicity as well. Additionally, the socio-economic 
and socio-political factors also play a crucial role in 
creating a harmonious and peaceful multi-cultural 
Malaysia.  
These are all factors which constantly need to be 
monitored in order to ensure that the rights of all 
Malaysians are secured. In order for this to happen, 
there is a need to be influential intellectuals and 
organizations, which play the key role of addressing 
these issues concerning religious pluralism. This is 
significant because these individuals and 
organizations seek to inform and educate the public 
about the necessity of maintaining respect for each 
other’s religions, thus avoiding any eruption of the 
ethnic violence that has been experienced in 
Malaysia’s history. 
APOSTASY 
Several groups and individuals expressed concerns 
that ‘obsessing’ over the exact numbers of apostasy 
cases runs the risk of missing the larger problems, as 
well as questions that should be addressed by the 
Muslim community and its religious authorities. It is 
believed that the Malay community is more worried 
about the Christian proselytizing rather than others. 
A pastor who spoke anonymously to the Asia Times 
said that he believed there was an average of 100 
Muslims per month converting to Christianity 
throughout Malaysia. One Christian group estimated 
that there were approximately 30,000 Malay converts 
in total. Official figures revealed are much lower, but 
many Malays convert secretly in order to avoid 
harassment and public humiliation. 
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These figures given above are without any concrete 
data to support these claims. The official data that
was obtained from the Syariah courts, State Religious 
Departments and the National Registration 
Department (NRD) reveal that the number of 
apostates among the Muslims is less than 300. 
Research shows that 750 Muslims applied to the 
NRD to change their names to non-Muslim names 
between 1999 and July 2003, and of that number only 
220 were successful. Most of them were converts to 
Islam, but the number of Muslims, who actually 
applied to the Syariah courts to renounce Islam is 
much lower; there were only 100 between 1994 and 
2003.   
Recently, The Islamic Affairs Minister Jamil Khir 
Baharom in response to a question in Parlimen dated 
14 June 2011 said that a total of 686 applications t  
renounce the Islamic faith were received by the 
Syariah courts between 2000 and 2010, 168 out of 
this number have been approved. 
Although article 11 of the Federal Constitution 
clearly guarantees religious freedom, the country's 
highest court ruled during the reporting period that 
Muslims wanting to convert to another religion must 
first obtain approval from a Shari'a court. The court's 
decision effectively precludes the conversion of 
Muslims, since the Sharia courts have granted only a 
handful of requests to convert to other religion in the 
recent years.   
The Shari'a laws are administered by the state 
authorities through Islamic courts and bind all 
Muslims, most of whom are of the Malay ethnicity. 
The Shari'a laws and the degree of their enforcement 
varied from one state to another. Shari'a courts do not 
give equal weight to the testimony of women. Several 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to 
the advancement of women's rights have complained 
that women do not receive a fair treatment from the 
Shari'a courts in matters of divorce and child custody.  
In December 2005, the Parliament passed the Islamic 
Family Law Act (IFLA) in an effort to harmonize the 
Shari'a laws throughout the country. The IFLA would 
have weakened a Muslim wife's ability to control her
private property during marriage, as well as 
enhancing the ability of Muslim men to divorce, take 
multiple wives, and claim an existing wife's property 
upon taking a new wife. Following the protests from 
the women's rights advocates about these and other 
provisions of the IFLA, the attorney general 
commenced a review of the law. As of June 30, 2007, 
the law had not been gazetted; the attorney general's 
chamber continued to review the proposed 
amendments to the IFLA.   
On May 30, 2007, the Federal Court ruled that 
Muslim individuals must obtain an order from the 
Shari'a Court stating that they have become an 
"apostate" (they have renounced Islam) before they 
can change their national identity card. As apostasy 
grants (grants of permission to convert to another 
religion) by the Shari'a court is extremely rare, the 
court's decision effectively precludes any legal right 
of the Muslims to convert to another religion. The 
2007 ruling was in response to an appeal in a 2005 
case in which the country's second-highest court, the 
Court of Appeal, upheld a High Court ruling that 
would allow a Muslim convert to initiate divorce 
proceedings in a Shari'a court, obtain custody of 
under-aged children from a non-Muslim spouse, and 
unilaterally convert the children to Islam. Following 
the condemnation of the secular courts' rulings by 
non-Muslim religious leaders and the Bar Council, 
the Court of Appeal agreed to stay in execution of its 
ruling until the non-Muslim spouse exhausts her 
appeal process before the Federal Court. That process 
continued as of June 30, 2007. 
Other child custody cases arose during the reporting 
period that reflect the turbulent jurisdictional 
interface between the Shari'a and secular courts on 
family law matters pitting Muslims versus non-
Muslims. One such case involved the 29-year-old 
Revathi Masoosai, who was raised as a Hindu by her 
grandmother, although she was born to Muslim 
parents and registered at birth as a Muslim. Revathi 
filed a statutory declaration in 2001 that identified 
herself as a Hindu. After she married a Hindu man in 
2004, worshipped as a Hindu, and gave birth in 
December 2005, the Malacca Islamic Religious 
Department (MAIM) accused Revathi of deviating 
from Islam and demanded custody of her newborn 
daughter. Revathi refused and on January 8, 2007, 
Revathi was taken into custody under the Shari'a 
court order.   
Despite the objections by Revathi and her husband, 
MAIM placed the couple's daughter in the care of 
Revathi's Muslim mother. Revathi's initial 100 days 
of "rehabilitation" detention was extended on April 
18, 2007, for an additional 80 days, reportedly dueto 
her refusal to cooperate with the Muslim religious 
authorities while in detention. Her husband filed a 
habeas corpus application in the High Court on May 
14, in an effort to secure Revathi's release. He 
claimed that the religious rehabilitation center in 
which she was held had not been gazetted as a 
detention center. As of June 30, 2007, Revathi 
remained in detention, and the High Court had not 
heard her husband's habeas corpus application. 
CONCLUSION : THE M ALAYSIAN DILEMMA   
The 21st century represents a period of great 
uncertainty about Malaysia’s state of religious 
pluralism. It is a serious question which affects all 
Malaysians because the outcome of this uncertainty 
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will determine Malaysia’s socio-economic position 
globally. While Malaysians have learned to live with 
people from other ethnic backgrounds, they are now 
confronted with a problem which arises as a result of 
this achievement. The uncertainty lies in the question 
of how can Malaysians live with each other’s religion 
in an age where all forms of religious 
fundamentalism are manifesting themselves globally.   
 The multi-religious setting of Malaysia is challeng d 
by the notions of religious relativism. How does one 
acknowledge the truths of his or her own religion 
without belittling or diminishing the truth(s) in other 
religions? This is a question that Malaysians have to 
deal with in their daily setting. Some have practiced a 
form of respect that is mixed with tolerance for other 
believers while most have remained silent and 
ignorant of this issue.  
The adage “ignorance is bliss” can be aptly used to 
describe the Malaysian society. Malaysians, in their 
educational and social upbringing are taught that 
religious discussions should not be held in public ut 
instead should be kept in the private realm. This is 
advocated with the intention of being sensitive to 
people from other ethnic backgrounds. While the 
intention is good, the outcome is otherwise because it 
cultivates a paradox within many Malaysians; they 
remain a sophisticated society in terms of their 
material growth but are constrained when it comes to 
the understanding of their multi-religiosity and multi-
ethnicity. 
As mentioned earlier, the Malaysians’ ability to steer 
away from the ethnic violence that occurred in 
Indonesia is an indication of Malaysia’s maturity as a 
country which espouses respect and tolerance for 
other ethnic groups. Inadvertently, the economic 
growth has created a Malaysian society that prefers to 
remain silent on matters pertaining to religion in 
order to avoid disrupting the continuous growth of 
the country. 
The government’s role in promoting silence rather 
than discussion when it comes to the understanding 
of multi-religious of Malaysia does not help to 
improve the situation. Any religious issue which is 
deemed sensitive is often dealt in silence rather tan 
with a discussion. The media is discouraged from 
reporting on matters related to religion.  
Without a proper understanding of the religion of 
their neighbors, it is difficult, if not impossible for 
Malaysians to truly learn to live with their neighbors 
and be pluralistic. Consequently, without knowing 
how to live with their neighbors, Malaysians simply 
cannot begin to have a “common social will” that is 
very much vital to the harmonious growth of the 
country. 
The government’s role in silencing the inter-faith 
discussions is best exemplified by Badawi’s recent 
banning of inter-faith forums on Article 11 in the 
Malaysian constitution which touches upon an 
individual’s religious freedom in Malaysia. 
According to Badawi, these forums must be stopped 
because “they are deemed to cause tension in our 
multi-religious society” (Habib and Shari, 2006). He 
also stated that “If the discussions are not kept in 
check or contained, they are bound to raise tension in 
our multi-religious society. Religious issues are ev n 
more sensitive than ethnic issues” (Habib and Shari, 
2006).5 This summarizes the Malaysian dilemma of 
today; how can Malaysians learn to co-exist 
peacefully without even learning who their neighbors 
are ethnically and religiously?   
The question of religious pluralism is one, which 
confronts all Malaysians, and it necessitates a 
solution. While the solution is not easy and needs to 
endure different social experimentations, many 
different groups and individuals have sensed the 
urgency to create a viable solution to this issue. The
need to create a Malaysian nation that is truly Asian, 
one, which truly respects the religious diversity, is 
more important than ever in this era of global 
terrorism because of Malaysia’s potential to become 
an example of an effective moderate Islamic majority 
country. In his visit to Malaysia to attend the World 
Council of Churches meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the 
Christian theologian Mark Heim wrote on Malaysia’s 
potential to become a role model to other Islamic 
countries: 
While Malaysia aspires to become a role model to 
other countries, the solution to the Malaysian 
dilemma must first be confronted and solved. Thus, 
the first step in formularizing a solution is to know 
the “Other", and this can only mean that all 
Malaysians must engage themselves in discussions 
concerning ethnic and religious pluralism for it is 
only then that Malaysia can be on the verge of 
                                                
5 In February 2005, the Bar Council of Malaysia 
organized a forum consisting of different religious 
organizations to discuss about the creation of an 
Interfaith Commission (IFC) to promote a better 
understanding of the different religions in Malaysia. 
However, Islamic organizations refused to join 
because they feared that the commission might 
“weaken Islam”. Subsequently, the government 
stopped the forum because it was deemed 
unnecessary while at the same time paradoxically 
voicing the need for inter-faith dialogue (US 
Department of State, 2005).  The Malaysian 
government’s encouragement of inter-faith dialogue 
can be observed in the World Council of Churches’ 
(WCC) meeting in Malaysia in 2004.  
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becoming truly Asia, not just symbolically, but in 
practice as well.   
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